The Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on the Global Positioning System (GPS) recommends that Selective Availability (SA) be removed by 2006. The question remains: if SA were to be turned off, how significant are the benefits to the GPS community? This paper examines the benefits of removing SA as it relates to airborne GPS integrity and demonstrates that there are substantial improvements in the availability of GPS integrity.
Introduction
Ever since DoD announced its policy of implementing SA on GPS, the civilian and military communities have been at odds over the need to keep SA on the system, especially during peacetime. The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) and the National Research Council (NRC) studies have recommended that the DoD turn off SA, while the RAND Corporation study concluded that it is not very detrimental to the civilian community to leave it on, due to the widespread implementation of differential GPS systems. The White House policy statement on GPS, known as the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD), was released March 29, 1996 and stated that it is the intention of DoD to turn off SA within a decade. The President of the United States will make an annual determination starting this year on the continued implementation of SA.
This paper examines the issue as it relates to airborne GPS integrity and demonstrates that there are substantial improvements in the availability of GPS integrity if SA were to be removed.
Background
The use of GPS for aviation is expanding rapidly worldwide. Within the United States, GPS has been approved as an IFR supplemental navigation system for domestic en route through nonprecision approach (NPA) phases of flight, and as a primary means system for oceanic navigation.
GPS differs from traditional land-based navigation systems because the satellites and areas of degraded signal coverage are in constant motion. If a satellite fails, or is taken out of service for maintenance, it is not known intuitively which areas, if any, may lose coverage. Also, GPS does not have a built-in real-time monitoring system which will satisfy aviation requirements. GPS receivers that are certified for aviation must have integrity, which means they can provide timely warnings to users when the GPS system is unreliable for navigation.
GPS integrity for supplemental navigation is provided by a method known as Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM). A certified GPS receiver has a RAIM algorithm which uses an overdetermined solution to perform a redundancy check of the measurements. The RAIM algorithm computes a horizontal protection level (HPL) that is based on the geometry of satellites at a given point in time. The HPL is the radius of a circle in the horizontal plane, centered at the true aircraft position, that is assured to contain the indicated horizontal position, with a given probability of missed detection and false alert.
Each phase of flight has a maximum horizontal alert limit (HAL) that it can support. For example, the horizontal alert limit for nonprecision approach is 0.3 nautical miles (555 meters). If the HPL exceeds this alert limit, RAIM is said to be unavailable for that phase of flight. Technical Standard Order (TSO) C-129, requires GPS receivers, certified for supplemental IFR navigation, to have RAIM [ 11. RAIM algorithms require a minimum of five visible satellites in order to detect a failure. There are occurrences, however, when the geometry of the visible satellites prevents detection of a failure even with the Baseline 24 constellation of GPS satellites and with the current operational constellation of 28 satellites. Also, satellites occasionally are taken out of service for maintenance, thereby further reducing the availability of RAIM. TSO C-129 stipulates that barometric altimeter aiding must be employed an extfa measurement to improve the availability of RAIM.
Figure 1 displays TSO C-129 RAIM coverage in the northern hemisphere for nonprecision approach (NPA) over a twelve-hour period with the Optimized 24 GPS constellation [2] , which is representative of the 24 GPS Block I1 satellites currently in orbit. The coverage is computed at five-minute time intervals for every five degrees of latitude and longitude, using a 7.5' mask angle as specified in the TSO and bar0 aiding. Since the GPS satellites are in approximately twelve-hour orbits, the coverage pattern will repeat itself in the opposite hemisphere during the next twelve hours.
Figure 1 demonstrates that even with 24 operational satellites, there are periods of up to 50 minutes in duration when GPS RAIM coverage is not available for a nonprecision approach at some locations. These outages will occur in the same location every day, although the time of day will shift by four minutes per day due to the sidereal orbit. The number of visible GPS satellites increases as latitudes approach the equator, which explains the higher availability in that region.
For GPS to be used as a primary means of navigation, the system must not only be able to detect the presence of an anomaly, but it also must be able to remove the faulty satellite from the solution. The integrity algorithm now requires six or more visible satellites. This technique is an extension of RAIM referred to as fault detection and exclusion (FDE). GPS alone will not be able to satisfy availability requirements for primary means navigation with FDE without additional satellites. The primary augmentation to GPS that the FAA is developing is the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS). Other possible augmentations include inertial navigation systems (INS), geostationary satellites for ranging, or satellites from another constellation such as Galileo or GLONASS.
RAIM/FDE Algorithm
As previously mentioned, RAIM (fault detection) requires a minimum of five visible satellites, while FDE requires a minimum of six visible satellites. The algorithm discussed in this paper is based on the parity space concept and uses the magnitude of the parity vector as the test statistic for detection of a satellite failure [3] . The inputs to the parity space algorithm are the standard deviation of the measurement noise, the measurement geometry, as well as the maximum allowable probabilities for a false alert and a missed detection. The output of the algorithm is the HPL, which defines the smallest horizontal radial position error that can be detected for the specified false alert and missed detection probabilities. The parity space method is based on chisquare statistics with n-4 degrees of freedom (DOF), where n is the number of visible satellites.
A characteristic slope line for each visible satellite is determined as a function of the horizontal position error vs. the test statistic. The satellite with the maximum slope will be the most difficult to detect. The horizontal protection level is determined by:
HPL=Slope,, pbias where pbias= o f i A is the noncentrality parameter of the noncentral chisquare density function and o is the standard deviation of the satellite pseudorange error.
The HPL is compared to the maximum horizontal alert limit for the phase of flight. If the HPL exceeds the HAL, then FDE is unavailable. The specifications for the maximum horizontal alert limit, as well as for the probability of false alert and missed detection probability are specified in Table 1 for each phase of flight.
Correlation Time without SA
A false alert occurs when no abnormal condition exists, but an alert is given to the pilot. Selective Availability is the most likely cause of false alerts and its effects are assumed to have a correlation time of two minutes. This corresponds a false alert rate of 6.667x105/sample for supplemental navigation and 3.333~10-~/sample for primary means navigation. Without SA, the ionosphere becomes the largest error source.
that an ionospheric error large enough to cause an alert should be considered a true alert. Under this assumption, the correlation time is driven by the receiver noise. The smoothing time constant of the receiver noise is assumed to be on the order of two minutes.
The second philosophy is that the correlation time is approximately one hour, based on the average length of time satellites are visible to the user. The correlation time is kept the same as the above case on a per sample basis ( 6 . 6 6 7~1 0~ or 3.333~10-~), but the false alert rate is more stringent on a per hour basis [4] . In both cases the detection threshold remains the same as for the case when SA is on.
The WAAS Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) [2] has been modified so that the receivers take advantage of the improvement in FDE availability if SA is turned off. Keeping the detection threshold the same will minimize changes to the FDE algorithm to take advantage of the SA-off condition. The WAAS MOPS will allow the manufacturer to decide which false alert rate philosophy to follow.
Use of User Range Accuracy
The User Range Accuracy (URA) can be used to determine the status of SA. The URA for each satellite equals:
where N ranges from 0 to 15. SA is assumed to be off if the URA is less than or equal to 16 meters (N16).
The integrity solution may be weighted by each satellite's URA or the receiver may operate in a binary mode where SA is assumed to be either off, or on, all of the satellites. The correlation time is used only for false alerts. Within RTCA SC-159, there were two philosophies on what the correlation time is without SA. The first philosophy is Other (thruster performance, etc.) 0.9 0.9
GPS Error Budget

Control
The accuracy with which a GPS receiver can determine position and velocity and synchronize to GPS time is dependent on a number of factors. GPS error sources are allocated into three categories: the space segment, control segment, and user segment. The error components which comprise these segments, as well as an estimate of the one-sigma value of each component is given in Table 2 151. -.
The most dominant error source by far is Selective Availability which produces a one-sigma error of 32.3 meters. These error sources are for the civilian coarse acquisition (CIA) code.
The effective accuracy of the pseudorange value is termed the user-equivalent range error (UERE). The system UERE is the root sum square (rss) of the individual error components. As shown in Table 2 , the one-sigma UERE is reduced from 33.3 m with SA to only 8 m when SA is removed. Further reduction in the UERE can be obtained A more conservative user error budget also was examined to account for larger receiver noise and ionospheric errors. The troposphere and multipath errors also were modified to agree with the supplemental GPS MOPS [ 6 ] . This error budget, shown in Table 3 , results in a one-sigma pseudorange error of 12.5 m without SA. The root sum square (rss) of the receiver noise, multipath, and interchannel bias equals 5 meters which is consistent with the value in the current WAAS MOPS. A one-sigma pseudorange error of 10 meters also was evaluated in this study.
A one-sigma pseudorange error of 12.5 meters for GPS without SA was adopted by RTCA SC-159 Working Group 2 for inclusion in the WAAS MOPS. As shown in Equations (1) and (2), the magnitude of the horizontal protection level is directly related to the standard deviation of the pseudorange error. This reduction of HPL naturally will translate into a significant improvement in availability. Improvement in RAIM and FDE availability for oceanic through nonprecision approach phases of flight with SA removed were analyzed using the one-sigma values for the pseudorange error discussed in the previous section. This section summarizes the parameters used in the R A I W D E availability analysis.
Both 7.5" and 5" mask angles were considered in this analysis. A 7.5 degree mask angle is specified in the supplemental GPS TSO. A five degree mask angle, however, is now the standard mask angle used for RTCA SC-159 analysis.
Bar0 Aiding Satellite Constellation
The availability analysis was performed with the GPS constellation consisting of 24 Block I1 satellites, known as the Optimized 24 constellation. This constellation is the RTCA SC-159 standard used for simulation purposes [2] . Up to three satellites were removed from the constellation to simulate satellite maintenance or failures. Average case GPS satellite failures were chosen based on an analysis performed by the Aerospace Corporation, which have been incorporated into RTCA SC-159 standard analysis parameters [7] . A 30 satellite constellation provided by Boeing Corp. also was analyzed.
Analysis Grid
RAIM and FDE performance of GPS was evaluated over a worldwide grid of points. This grid consists of points evenly spaced every three degrees in latitude from 90"N down to 0"s and of longitude points around the globe, spaced by the cosine of the latitude. The grid was sampled every 5 min. in time from 0O:OO UTC to 12:OO UTC. A twelve-hour period was chosen since the coverage will repeat in the opposite hemisphere during the following 12 hours.
Improvement of availability by incorporation of a barometric altimeter also was included in this analysis for the nonprecision approach phase of flight. The standard deviation of the barometric altimeter error was assumed to be 50 meters for nonprecision approach.
Availability Results
The results of this analysis demonstrate a significant improvement in availability and reduction of outage duration if SA were to be turned off. Availability increases for all modes of flight, but most dramatically for NPA. Table 4 gives the availability for fault detection with a mask angle of 7.5'. For nonprecision approach, availability increases from 96.4% with SA to greater than 99.6% if SA is removed. Table 5 provides the maximum outage duration occurring at any location in the analysis grid. The maximum outage duration for nonprecision approach decreases from more than one hour to a half hour or less without SA.
When the mask angle is reduced to 5', availability increases to greater than 99.9% for nonprecision approach when SA is removed, as shown in Table 6 . The maximum outage durations are given in Table 7 . Fault detection and FDE availability results with and without SA are provided in Appendix A for cases of one, two, and three satellites removed from the constellation. Fault detection and €DE availability then were examined with the addition of barometric altimeter aiding for the nonprecision approach mode of flight. As shown in Table  10 and Figure 6 , availability approaches 100% for fault detection with a 7.5" mask angle if SA is removed. If the mask angle is reduced to So, 100% availability is achieved with a 24-satellite constellation. Similarly for FDE, availability for nonprecision approach is greater than 99% when bar0 aiding is used and SA is removed, as shown in Table 11 and Figure 7 . Tables 12  and 13 provide FDE availability and max. outage duration for a 30 SV constellation when SA is removed. Since additional GPS satellites may be part of the modernization effort, slightly different UEREs were considered. The 12.5 and 8 m are the same used previously in this study. A UERE of 6 m represents a conservative estimate for a dual frequency receiver when two civil frequencies are available.
Additionally, with the accuracy improvement initiative (AII), the UERE may be as low as 1.5 m. Only FDE availability is shown for the 30 SV constellation since RAIM availability is 100% with SA removed. If bar0 aiding is incorporated for NPA, the availability approaches 5 9's with only a 5 min. outage at a 12.5 m UERE and 100% for the others. 
Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that there are substantial improvements in the availability of GPS integrity, both for supplemental and primary means navigation if SA is turned off. With incorporation of the bar0 altimeter, fault detection availability approaches 100% with a 7.5' mask angle and does reach 100% if the mask angle is reduced to 5". There is a significant improvement in the availability of FDE as well. Although the availability is not high enough to satisfy primary means requirements, it is important to quantify the magnitude of this improvement when SA is turned off. With a 30 SV constellation, FDE availability approaches 100% for all phases of flight.
Similar results could be expected from augmentation by geostationary SVs or Galileo.
The WAAS MOPS will be modified so that receiver equipment is designed to take advantage of the increased availability if SA is turned off.
